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Abstract 
Weight illusions – where one object feels heavier than an identically-weighted counterpart – have 
been the focus of many recent scientific investigations. The most famous of these illusions is the 
'size-weight illusion', where a small object feels heavier than an identically-weighted, but otherwise 
similar-looking, larger object. There are, however, a variety of similar illusions which can be induced 
by varying other stimulus properties, such as surface material, temperature, colour, and even shape. 
Despite well over 100 years of research, there is little consensus about the mechanisms 
underpinning these illusions. In this review, I will first provide an overview of the weight illusions 
which have been described. I will then outline the dominant theories which have emerged over the 
past decade for why we consistently misperceive the weights of objects which vary in size, with a 
particular focus on the role of lifters' expectations of heaviness. Finally, I will discuss the magnitude 
of the various weight illusions, and suggest how this largely-overlooked facet of the topic might 
resolve some of the debates surrounding the cause of these misperceptions of heaviness.  
 
 
Keywords: size-weight illusion, material-weight illusion, object lifting, grip force, weight perception, 
expectations  
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Some of the earliest illusions to be formally described are illusions of heaviness, where objects 
subjectively feel lighter or heavier than they actually are. These are most compellingly demonstrated 
in situations where identically-weighted objects are made to feel as if they weigh different amounts 
from one another. This article is intended to provide a brief overview of the weight illusions which 
have been described since the late 1800s, and provide an up-to-date commentary on the possible 
causes of the size-weight illusion. This article is not intended to be a review of the history of weight 
illusion research, and the interested reader can read comprehensive historical treatments from 
other authors (Ross 1969; Murray et al. 1999; Nicolas et al. 2012).     
 
1.1 - A brief taxonomy of weight illusions 
The obvious place to start this review is with the famous 'size-weight illusion' (SWI), which is by far 
the most well-studied of all the illusions of heaviness. The SWI occurs when small and large objects 
are adjusted to have identical masses. When these identically-weighted objects are lifted, the 
smaller object invariably feels heavier than the larger object (Charpentier 1891). The illusion is 
cognitively impenetrable, meaning that the illusion is equivalent even if you are told the objects 
weigh the same amount as one another (Flournoy 1894).. It can be induced with haptic feedback of 
the size differences (i.e., perceiving the objects' sizes with your sense of touch alone) or visual 
feedback of the size differences (i.e., lifting the differently-sized objects with a handle attached to 
the top surface). Lifting per se isn't even required to experience the illusion – a misperception of 
mass can be generated by gently pushing different-sized objects which are dangling from strings 
(Plaisier and Smeets 2012). The SWI is experienced by children as young as two years old (Robinson 
1964; Pick and Pick 1967) and, interestingly, the magnitude of the illusion appears to diminish 
throughout childhood ((Gordon et al. 1992). The SWI does not diminish with repeated experiences 
or interactions with the illusion-inducing objects, and recent neuroimaging research suggests that its 
neural locus is in the left ventral premotor cortex (Chouinard et al. 2009). 
The next-most famous illusion of heaviness is the 'material-weight illusion' (MWI). As the name 
suggests, the illusion is induced though variations in the surface material, rather than the size, of 
identically-weighted objects. In this case, objects which appear to be made from a heavy-looking 
material, such as metal, will feel slightly lighter than identically-weighted objects which appear to be 
made from a low density material, such as polystyrene (Wolfe 1898; Seashore 1899; Harshfield and 
DeHardt 1970; Buckingham et al. 2009). Ellis and Lederman (1999) demonstrated that this illusion 
could be evoked without actually touching the objects' surfaces, indicating that the effect must stem 
participants’ learned associations between material properties and object weight rather than 
peripheral factors such as differences in the friction of the different materials (see also Buckingham 
et al. 2011). However, the effect is at its most impressive when the lifter is allowed haptic feedback 
(with or without visual feedback) of the material properties, suggesting some these expectations 
may combine in an additive way with peripheral factors. 
There exists a category of weight illusions which can be understood entirely as learned, top-down, 
effects. Ellis and Lederman (1998) created an illusion based on golfers’ expertise with similar-
looking, but (in the real world) much lighter, practice golf balls. When the practice golf balls were 
adjusted to weigh the same amount as the real golf balls, expert golfers judged the altered practice 
balls as feeling heavier than the real golf balls. Non-golfers, who had no prior expectations regarding 
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the weight of practice golf balls, did not experience this illusion, detecting no differences in weight 
between the identically-weighted real and practice balls. More surprisingly, Dijker (2008) 
demonstrated that the SWI can be enhanced with social cues, such that female dolls feel far heavier 
than one would expect them to in comparison to larger male dolls (relative to the SWI generated 
with a variety of cans which had similar volume and mass relationships to the dolls). As this effect 
disappeared participants lifted these dolls with their eyes closed, this weight illusion presumably 
reflected participants' expectations that females will weigh less than males. There has even been 
recent evidence that embodiment-style effects can cause differences in how heavy objects feel 
when they are lifted. Schneider et al. (2011) demonstrated that, when casually told by an 
experimenter that a book is important (in a scholarly sense), subjects judged it as feeling up to one 
third heavier than individuals who were given no information about the importance of the book. 
Interestingly this effect did not appear to be mediated by participants’ expectations about how 
valuable the book was, which led the authors to conclude that the effect represents the 
embodiment of an abstract linkage between the concepts of mass and importance. It does, however, 
remain an open question as to whether these effects may be mediated by the perceived volume of 
the books, which would seem to be an equally plausible mechanism (i.e., more important books 
might contain more information and thus be larger).  
Finally, there are several less well-known weight illusions which appear to be conceptually related to 
the MWI. The brightness-weight illusion describes an effect whereby light-coloured objects feel 
slightly heavier than darker objects (De Camp 1917) –an effect mediated by individuals’ expectations 
that dark-coloured objects will be heavier than light-coloured objects (Walker et al. 2010). The 
shape-weight illusion (Dresslar 1894), was originally described as differences in the perceived weight 
of flat sheets of lead as a function of their 2-dimensional shape, with more compact shapes feeling 
heavier than less compact shapes. This rather vague description has been somewhat clarified, with 
recent research indicating that there are large individual differences in how the 3-dimensional shape 
of objects (i.e., whether they are spheres, cubes, and tetrahedrons) can affect weight perception 
(Kahrimanovic et al. 2011), suggesting the shape-weight illusion is due to individuals' prior 
experiences with objects of these shapes rather than invariant conservation-style errors of a 
particular shape's volume. The final illusion in this vein was described in 1846 by Weber (translated 
by Ross and Murray 1996), who noted that an object’s temperature will affect its weight, such that a 
cold coin placed on the forehead of a supine individual will feel heavier than the same coin at room 
temperature – the so-called ‘Silver Thaler illusion’ (more commonly known as the 'temperature-
weight illusion'). 
 
1.2 – Proposed causes of weight illusions 
The weight illusions outlined above not involving manipulations of size (e.g., Buckingham et al. 2011; 
Dijker 2008; Ellis and Lederman 1998) are thought to be caused by violated expectations: when  
lifters expect something to be heavy it feels comparatively light when it is lifted, and vice versa (Ross 
1969). The contrastive nature of this perceptual effect is in itself interesting because many illusory 
effects have been described in terms of Bayesian-style integration, where priors are combined with 
sensory input to form the percept (see Ernst 2009 for a brief overview in the context of the SWI). 
Weight illusions, on the other hand, have been termed as 'anti-Bayesian' (Brayanov and Smith 2010) 
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due to the way that sensory input appears to reflect an opposition, rather than an integration, with 
the expectations (i.e., the perceptual priors). These effects, it has been suggested, represent a 
unique way that our perceptual system deals with outliers in the statistics of the environment (such 
as what a particular material should weigh, see Baugh et al. 2012). It is not difficult to imagine that 
the ability to detect and tag an unusually-weighted object could be a useful skill in an evolutionary 
context in allowing an individual to predict, for example, if a fruit is not yet ripe or if a piece of 
firewood is too damp to be flammable. There is, however, far less consensus in the literature about 
whether this top-down view can account for the SWI, for which several competing hypotheses exist. 
 
1.2.1 - Sensorimotor hypothesis 
A promising early explanation for the SWI came in the form of a sensorimotor mismatch hypothesis, 
stemming from the predictive way in which our fingertip forces are parameterised when lifting 
objects (Davis and Roberts 1976). When lifting the large object in a SWI-inducing pair for the first 
time, it will invariably be lifted with a higher rate of force than the smaller object. Critically, this also 
means that the large object will be lifted with a higher rate of force than necessary and the small 
object will be lifted with a suboptimal (lower) rate of force, causing opposing mismatches between 
efference and afferance. The opposite direction of these mismatches between expectation and 
action for the small and large objects would lead to the inevitable percept that the small objects 
outweigh the large objects. These sensorimotor ‘errors’ appear to be a viable cause for the illusion 
during initial lifts of the SWI-inducing objects, where individuals do indeed overestimate the force 
requirements of lifting the large object and underestimate the force requirements of lifting the small 
object (Gordon et al. 1991). This hypothesis is compatible with a range of well-established peripheral 
effects which can impact an individual’s perception of how heavy an object feels, such as muscle 
fatigue (Jones and Hunter 1983; Burgess and Jones 1997), tactile sensitivity (Gandevia et al. 1980), 
gripping force (Flanagan et al. 1995), and even the fingers used to lift (Flanagan and Bandomir 2000). 
However, in a well-cited study Flanagan and Beltzner (2000) showed that the illusion is not 
dependant on these peripheral effects. In their study, when lifting SWI-inducing objects over 
multiple trials, individuals rapidly adapted their fingertip forces from the expectation-driven 
overestimations and underestimations to the actual (and identical) weights of the illusion-inducing 
objects over the course of a few lifts. In other words, a lifter's fingertip force errors will be rapidly 
corrected with practice, but their perceptual illusion remains strong and stable. This independence 
of the lifting errors from the perceptual illusion suggests that the SWI is unlikely to have a 
sensorimotor origin (see also Grandy and Westwood 2006; Mon-Williams and Murray 2000). 
  
1.2.2 - Bottom-up hypotheses 
In contrast of the efference-driven sensorimotor hypothesis, bottom-up explanations describe 
several different (although not mutually exclusive) hypothetical mechanisms where a lifter directly 
perceives an ecologically-relevant variable, related to the relationship between volume and mass, 
which they mistakenly interpret as heaviness.  
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The simplest form of this bottom-up argument suggests that lifters perceive an object’s density (a 
small object is, by definition, more dense than an equally-weighted large object), which they 
erroneously report as its weight (Ross and Di Lollo 1970; Stevens and Rubin 1970). Thus, because 
perceived weight and physical density seem to have a strong positive relationship, individuals may 
be unable to readily disentangle one from the other. This idea is analogous to common naïve physics 
misunderstandings, such as the common belief that objects of different weight will fall at different 
speeds (Kozhevnikov and Hegarty 2001). 
While this explanation is, on the face of it, plausible, it is unclear why we would accurately 
experience one physical dimensions (e.g., density) all the while inaccurately experiencing other 
clearly related physical dimensions (e.g., weight). This problem has been addressed by Gibson 
(1979), who proposed that we only perceive items in the environment in terms of their action-
relevant properties (known as affordances), rather than abstract physical properties. Bottom-up 
explanations in this ecological vein tend to focus on properties which are overtly relevant for action. 
Noting that large objects will typically have a different centre of mass than smaller objects, 
regardless of their weight, Amazeen and Turvey (1996) demonstrated that altering the mass 
distribution of hammer-like rods had a much larger effect on the perceived heaviness than altering 
the mass itself. This finding suggests that our ability to detect an object's rotational inertia while 
being wielded (i.e., the property of inertia tensor) may underpin the haptic SWI. This explanation, 
however, does not appear to explain the effects that visual size information can have on perceptions 
of heaviness. Furthermore, it is worth noting that even if weight illusions can be induced through 
variations in rotational inertia, it is far from clear whether this is the way this effect is naturally 
obtained. 
In a similar action-driven vein, Zhu and Bingham (2011) examined participant's judgements for the 
diameter they could throw the furthest for a sphere of a given weight and noted that these 
judgements were well-matched to judgements of the perceived weight of spheres which varied in 
mass and volume. They concluded that, rather than a being a misperception of heaviness, the SWI is 
a consequence of our perceptual expertise in selecting, based on the relationship between mass and 
volume, which object from a set could be thrown the furthest – the property of ‘throwability’. It is 
worth noting that this explanation gives no insight into the physical nature of the low-level variable 
which is perceived in the stead of an object’s mass. However, a follow-up study examining throwing 
and weight illusions demonstrated that alterations to a sphere’s centres of mass (i.e., manipulating 
their rotational inertia) does not affect throwability judgements or weight judgements for the 
different volume and mass relationships (Zhu et al. 2013), suggesting that the rotational effects 
described by Amazeen and Turvey (1996) are not be applicable to the classic hand-held SWI. 
 
1.2.3 - Top-down hypothesis 
The top-down explanation of the SWI takes a very different conceptual approach from bottom-up, 
ecological explanations. Here, instead of directly perceiving a variable which is consciously 
understood as weight, the percept of an illusory weight difference comes about through a 
combination of prior experience with current sensory input. In the case of the SWI, an individual's 
conscious perception of how heavy the objects feel reflects a contrast to their expectations of how 
heavy the large and small objects should be in relation to one another. It is worth noting that this 
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variant of top-down, contrastive effect is not necessarily the same as the explanation outlined above 
for the MWI. In the SWI, the contrast can arise purely as a relational contrast with the other 
object(s) in the set; a short-term expectation for the object lifted 2
nd
 in relation to the larger or 
smaller object lifted beforehand. The importance of this short-term, relational expectation is 
emphasised by the fact that many SWI paradigms use stimuli that do not have a clear visual cue to 
density (i.e., the material from which they are made is not readily identifiable). The MWI, on the 
other hand, reflects a contrast to long term prior expectations (i.e., that the heavy-feeling 
polystyrene is heavier than all other polystyrene objects which the lifter has encountered), and the 
visual identity of each object is obviously emphasised. Whether this distinction is a meaningful one 
to the perceptual system remains unclear, and needs further empirical investigation. 
Recent work has provided a compelling demonstration of how statistical regularities in the objects 
we interact with can drive our subsequent perceptual experience (Flanagan et al. 2008). In several 
experiments, participants repeatedly lifted sets of objects which had an inverted size-weight 
relationship (i.e., the larger the object in a set, the lower its mass), in order to alter their prior 
expectations. The participants were then invited to judge the weight of similar-looking large and 
small objects which weighed the same amount as one another, in order to see if they experienced 
the usual SWI. Subjects who were given a relatively small amount of experience with the inverse-
density objects (lifting them just over 1000 times in a single session) experienced a slightly smaller-
than-normal SWI; the small object felt only moderately heavier than the large object. A second 
group, who lifted the inverse-density objects 1000 times a day for three consecutive days, did not 
experience the SWI at all – the identically-weighted large and small objects felt as if they weighed 
the same amount. Finally, and most convincingly, subjects who experienced the inverse density 
objects over a period of 11 days before lifting the identically-weighted objects reported that the 
large object felt substantially heavier than its identically-weighted smaller counterpart – an inverted 
version of the SWI. This study was the first to show a direct link between prior experience and 
subsequent weight perception in the context of weight illusions, providing the strongest rejection 
yet of bottom-up theories of weight illusions. 
More evidence for the representational basis of the SWI comes from a recent study which 
demonstrated that the SWI can be evoked in a single, unchanging, object by priming a lifter's 
expectations of what they are about to lift (Buckingham and Goodale 2010a). Subjects in this task 
were shown a large, small, or medium cube before having their visual feedback removed. Then, 
unbeknownst to the subjects, the previewed cube was taken away and replaced by the medium-
sized cube, which subjects lifted on every single trial with their vision blocked. Subjects experienced 
a robust SWI - when they saw the small cube in the preview phase, the medium-sized cube that they 
lifted felt substantially heavier than it felt after they had previewed the large cube. This study is also 
particularly difficult to reconcile with bottom-up theories of the SWI, as the perceptual illusion  could 
not have been caused by anything other than participants’ expectations of what they were about to 
lift, as the physical properties of the object they lifted did not change from trial to trial.  
 
1.3 – Different types of expectations 
In the SWI, the illusion-causing expectations about how heavy the object will be in relation to one 
another are built up across a lifetime of experiencing the regular positive correlation between size 
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and weight with objects in the world. We repeatedly encounter objects with a positive size-weight 
association, leading us to expect (sensibly) that large objects will outweigh small objects (because, 
on average, they will). This statistical regularity leads individuals to predict that the large object will 
outweigh the small object. As outlined above, the illusion-inducing expectation is not the one that 
drives sensorimotor prediction; perception of the SWI appears to be unrelated to grip and load force 
rates on a given trial (Flanagan and Beltzner 2000). Furthermore, this expectation isn’t even one 
which an individual could readily articulate; after picking up the lighter-than-expected large cube in a 
standard SWI experiment only once, the lifter will readily report that they don't expect the large 
cube to be particularly heavy. But nevertheless, the SWI does not get smaller with repeated lifts of 
the illusion-inducing stimuli. This observation has led many scientists to conclude that expectations 
are unlikely to play a role in the SWI. However, an alternative explanation is that there are multiple 
types of expectation, all of which play a role in various sensorimotor processes. 
Recent evidence suggests that there may, in fact, be three separate expectations/representations 
which play a role when we lift objects. First, measured simply by asking individuals how heavy they 
expect an object to be, there are expectations which inform our conscious understanding of how 
heavy something should be. These expectations appear to be highly specific to material properties 
and the situational context of the lift. Second, by measuring fingertip forces, there are independent 
expectations which drive our sensorimotor prediction, which rapidly and precisely adjust on a trial-
to-trial basis. The final expectations which come in to play are apparent when we judge the weights 
of objects and experience the SWI. Recent evidence indicates that this illusion-causing expectation 
does not appear to be specific to particular families of objects, unlike the sensorimotor prediction or 
conscious expectations of heaviness.  Buckingham and Goodale (2013) investigated the magnitude 
of the SWI in various materials, noting that the illusion induced by large and small metal cubes was 
the same magnitude as the illusion induced by large and small polystyrene cubes. If the conscious 
expectations drove the illusion, subjects would have experienced a large SWI with the metal cubes, 
which they expected to have a far greater density than the polystyrene cubes. Thus, the 
representation which drives the SWI is not only independent from sensorimotor performance 
and/or expectation, but is also distinct from participants’ cognitive understanding of the weight 
differences and density. It is important to note that, in the majority of situations in the real world, 
these various expectations are well-aligned. It is only in experimentally-contrived situations, such as 
when lifting illusion-inducing stimuli, that these expectations can be dissociated from one another. 
 
1.4 - Strength of illusions 
Expectation-driven contrast effects appear to explain the MWI and other classes of top-down weight 
illusions (e.g., Ellis and Lederman 1998; Dijker 2008). However, it is less clear whether expectations 
can fully account for the SWI. There are, in fact, several perspectives from which the SWI seems to 
be qualitatively different from other weight illusions. Most notably, the SWI is by far the most 
powerful weight illusion which has been documented. Although it is difficult to systematically 
compare the magnitude of the various weight illusions across laboratories, studies which have 
examined the visual size and material weight illusions using identical protocols and well-matched 
stimuli (700g cubes, lifted with a precision grip by handle on their top surface - Buckingham et al. 
Page 8 of 35Experimental Brain Research
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
2009; Buckingham and Goodale 2013; Buckingham and Goodale 2010b) show the SWI to be 
approximately three times the size of the MWI. 
There are also wide variations in the magnitude of the SWI, depending on the experimental protocol 
used to induce it. For one, the SWI is markedly reduced in the experiments which have provided the 
strongest evidence for expectations causing the misperception of weight (summarised in Section 
1.2.3). The variant of the SWI induced in a single object by priming participants' expectations  is only 
half the size of the normal SWI induced by lifting three objects with full vision (Buckingham and 
Goodale 2010a). Similarly, the magnitude of the inverted SWI (Flanagan et al. 2008) was less than 
half the size of the normal, un-inverted, SWI. Critically, the magnitude of the inverted illusion never 
became as strong as the un-inverted SWI, remaining stunted for a further 22 days of experiencing 
the inverted objects, suggesting there are limits to the plasticity of the SWI. As the studies which 
provide the strongest evidence for the role of expectations inducing the SWI show reduced-
magnitude illusions, it is clear that the illusion-inducing expectations outlined in Section 1.3 cannot 
alone account for the 'full' experience of the SWI.  
It has been known for some time that the haptic SWI is substantially larger than the visual SWI, and 
providing concurrent visual and haptic feedback does little to increase the illusion's strength over 
the haptic-only illusion (Ellis and Lederman 1993). As we are skilled at detecting variations in 
rotational inertia through haptics (Amazeen and Turvey 1996), it is possible that the fullest SWI 
comes about through a combination of top-down (i.e., expectation-driven) and bottom-up (i.e., 
ecological) effects. As outlined above, the top-down effects appear to account for about half of the 
illusion, presumably leaving various bottom-up effects to contribute to the remainder of the illusory 
differences in weight when they are permitted. The strength of these bottom-up effects likely vary 
as a function of the type of actions participants use to judge the weights of the objects in an 
experiment (i.e., precision-grip lifting, cupping and lifting the object in one's hand, or jiggling the 
object to sense it's torques). Thus, the smaller illusion experienced by participants in the single-
object SWI study (Buckingham and Goodale 2010a) can be taken to reflect the lack of differences in 
bottom-up stimulus properties seen in usual, multi-object, SWI studies. Similarly, the consistently 
smaller magnitude of the inverted SWI  (Flanagan et al. 2008) may stem from placing the top-down 
expectations and the bottom-up differences between the stimuli in opposition to one another.  It is 
not yet clear which bottom-up factors may contribute most to the sense of heaviness, although it 
likely that this is dependent on dynamics of the lifting task and constrained by the shape of the 
object being lifted (Amazeen and Turvey 1996; Zhu et al. 2013).  
In addition to the magnitude of the illusion, future work might benefit from studying the resilience 
of the illusion under various contexts. To date, only the SWI has been examined in this light, and has 
been shown to be remarkably robust to change, with thousands of trials over multiple days required 
to change the magnitude of the effect. Presumably this degree of resilience reflects some aspect of 
how the prior information (i.e., expectations of heaviness) associated with size cues are encoded and 
utilized by the sensorimotor system. It remains to be seen whether expectations derived from 
material or other more cognitive cues are similarly resilient to change. 
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1.5 - Summary 
Taken together, the literature presented in this review suggests that, in isolation, none of the 
dominant hypotheses surrounding weight illusions can fully account for the SWI. However, it is likely 
that a combination of top-down (i.e., expectations of heaviness) and bottom-up (e.g., rotational 
inertia) effects can explain the illusory misperception of heaviness. Future work should aim to 
determine the nature of the bottom-up influences in weight perception as a function of the lifting 
task, in addition to identifying how these bottom-up effects interact with top-down expectations 
across the various types of weight illusion. 
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Abstract 
Weight illusions – where one object feels heavier than an identically-weighted counterpart – have 
been the focus of many recent scientific investigations. The most famous of these illusions is the 
'size-weight illusion', where a small object feels heavier than an identically-weighted, but otherwise 
similar-looking, larger object. There are, however, a variety of similar illusions which can be induced 
by varying other stimulus properties, such as surface material, temperature, colour, and even shape. 
Despite well over 100 years of research, there is little consensus about the mechanisms 
underpinning these illusions. In this review, I will first provide an overview of the weight illusions 
which have been described. I will then outline the dominant theories which have emerged over the 
past decade for why we consistently misperceive the weights of objects which vary in size, with a 
particular focus on the role of lifters' expectations of heaviness. Finally, I will discuss the magnitude 
of the various weight illusions, and suggest how this largely-overlooked facet of the topic might 
resolve some of the debates surrounding the cause of these misperceptions of heaviness.  
 
 
Keywords: size-weight illusion, material-weight illusion, object lifting, grip force, weight perception, 
expectations  
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Some of the earliest illusions to be formally described are illusions of heaviness, where objects 
subjectively feel lighter or heavier than they actually are. These are most compellingly demonstrated 
in situations where identically-weighted objects are made to feel as if they weigh different amounts 
from one another. This article is intended to provide a brief overview of the weight illusions which 
have been described since the late 1800s, and provide an up-to-date commentary on the possible 
causes of the size-weight illusion. This article is not intended to be a review of the history of weight 
illusion research, and the interested reader can read comprehensive historical treatments from 
other authors (Ross 1969; Murray et al. 1999; Nicolas et al. 2012)(Murray et al. 1999; Nicolas et al. 
2012; Ross 1969).     
 
1.1 - A brief taxonomy of weight illusions 
The obvious place to start this review is with the famous 'size-weight illusion' (SWI), which is by far 
the most well-studied of all the illusions of heaviness. The SWI occurs when small and large objects 
are adjusted to have identical masses. When these identically-weighted objects are lifted, the 
smaller object invariably feels heavier than the larger object (Charpentier 1891). This effect is easy to 
induce – placing a brick inside a small cardboard box will make it feel heavier than the same brick 
inside a large cardboard box. The illusion is also cognitively impenetrable, meaning that (i.e., the the 
illusion is equivalent even if you are told the objects weigh the same amount as one another - 
(Flournoy 1894).. It can be induced with haptic feedback of the size differences (i.e., perceiving the 
objects' sizes with your sense of touch alone) or visual feedback of the size differences (i.e., lifting 
the differently-sized objects with a handle attached to the top surface). Lifting per se isn't even 
required to experience the illusion – a misperception of mass can be generated by gently pushing 
different-sized objects which are dangling from strings (Plaisier and Smeets 2012). The SWI is 
experienced by children as young as two years old (Robinson 1964; Pick and Pick 1967) and, 
interestingly, the magnitude of the illusion appears to diminish throughout childhood ((Gordon et al. 
1992)Pick and Pick 1967). The SWI does not diminish with repeated experiences or interactions with 
the illusion-inducing objects, and recent neuroimaging research suggests that its neural locus is in 
the left ventral premotor cortex (Chouinard et al. 2009). 
The next-most famous illusion of heaviness is the 'material-weight illusion' (MWI). As the name 
suggests, the illusion is induced though variations in the surface material, rather than the size, of 
identically-weighted objects. In this case, objects which appear to be made from a heavy-looking 
material, such as metal, will feel slightly lighter than identically-weighted objects which appear to be 
made from a low density material, such as polystyrene (Wolfe 1898; Seashore 1899; Harshfield and 
DeHardt 1970; Buckingham et al. 2009)(Buckingham et al. 2009; Harshfield and DeHardt 1970; 
Seashore 1899; Wolfe 1898). Ellis and Lederman (1999) demonstrated that this illusion could be 
evoked without actually touching the objects' surfaces, indicating that the effect must stem 
participants’ learned associations between material properties and object weight rather than 
peripheral factors such as differences in the friction of the different materials (see also Buckingham 
et al. 2011). However, the effect is at its most impressive when the lifter is allowed haptic feedback 
(with or without visual feedback) of the material properties, suggesting some these expectations 
may combine in an additive way with peripheral factors. 
Field Code Changed
Formatted: Font: Calibri
Formatted: Font: +Body (Calibri)
Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed
Formatted: Font: Calibri
Field Code Changed
Formatted: Font: Calibri
Formatted: Font: +Body (Calibri)
Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed
Formatted: Font: Calibri
Formatted: Font: +Body (Calibri)
Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed
Page 18 of 35Experimental Brain Research
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
There exists a category of weight illusions which can be understood entirely as learned, top-down, 
effects. Ellis and Lederman (1998) created an illusion based on golfers’ expertise with similar-
looking, but (in the real world) much lighter, practice golf balls. When the practice golf balls were 
adjusted to weigh the same amount as the real golf balls, expert golfers judged the altered practice 
balls as feeling heavier than the real golf balls. Non-golfers, who had no prior expectations regarding 
the weight of practice golf balls, did not experience this illusion, detecting no differences in weight 
between the identically-weighted real and practice balls. More surprisingly, Dijker (2008) 
demonstrated that the SWI can be enhanced with social cues, such that female dolls feel far heavier 
than one would expect them to in comparison to larger male dolls (relative to the SWI generated 
with a variety of cans which had similar volume and mass relationships to the dolls). As this effect 
disappeared participants lifted these dolls with their eyes closed, this weight illusion presumably 
reflected participants' expectations that females will weigh less than males. There has even been 
recent evidence that embodiment-style effects can cause differences in how heavy objects feel 
when they are lifted. Schneider et al. (2011) demonstrated that, when casually told by an 
experimenter that a book is important (in a scholarly sense), subjects judged it as feeling up to one 
third heavier than individuals who were given no information about the importance of the book. 
Interestingly this effect did not appear to be mediated by participants’ expectations about how 
valuable the book was, which led the authors to conclude that the effect represents the 
embodiment of an abstract linkage between the concepts of mass and importance. It does, however, 
remain an open question as to whether these effects may be mediated by the perceived volume of 
the books, which would seem to be an equally plausible m chanism (i.e., more important books 
might contain more information and thus be larger).  
Finally, there are several less well-known weight illusions which appear to be conceptually related to 
the MWI. The brightness-weight illusion describes an effect whereby light-coloured objects feel 
slightly heavier than darker objects (De Camp 1917) –an effect mediated by individuals’ expectations 
that dark-coloured objects will be heavier than light-coloured objects (Walker et al. 2010). The 
shape-weight illusion (Dresslar 1894), was originally described as differences in the perceived weight 
of flat sheets of lead as a function of their 2-dimensional shape, with more compact shapes feeling 
heavier than less compact shapes. This rather vague description has been somewhat clarified, with 
recent research indicating that there are large individual differences in how the 3-dimensional shape 
of objects (i.e., whether they are spheres, cubes, and tetrahedrons) can affect weight perception 
(Kahrimanovic et al. 2011), suggesting the shape-weight illusion is due to individuals' prior 
experiences with objects of these shapes rather than invariant conservation-style errors of a 
particular shape's volume. The final illusion in this vein was described in 1846 by Weber (translated 
by Ross and Murray 1996), who noted that an object’s temperature will affect its weight, such that a 
cold coin placed on the forehead of a supine individual will feel heavier than the same coin at room 
temperature – the so-called ‘Silver Thaler illusion’ (more commonly known ats the 'temperature-
weight illusion'). 
 
1.2 – Proposed causes of weight illusions 
The peripheral weight illusions are through to stem from various biomechanical factors, and will not 
receive discussion here. The top-downweight illusions outlined above not involving manipulations of 
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size (e.g., Buckingham et al. 2011; Dijker 2008; Ellis and Lederman 1998) are thought to be caused by 
violated expectations: when  lifters expect something to be heavy it feels comparatively light when it 
is lifted, and vice versa (Ross 1969). The contrastive nature of this perceptual effect is in itself 
interesting because many illusory effects have been described in terms of Bayesian-style integration, 
where priors are combined with sensory input to form the percept (see Ernst 2009 for a brief 
overview in the context of the SWI). Weight illusions, on the other hand, have been termed as 'anti-
Bayesian' (Brayanov and Smith 2010) due to the way that sensory input appears to reflect an 
opposition, rather than an integration, with the expectations (i.e., the perceptual priors). These 
effects, it has been suggested, represent a unique way that our perceptual system deals with outliers 
in the statistics of the environment (such as what a particular material should weigh, see Baugh et al. 
2012). It is not difficult to imagine that the ability to detect and tag an unusually-weighted object 
could be a useful skill in an evolutionary context in allowing an individual to predict, for example, if a 
fruit is not yet ripe or if a piece of firewood is too damp to be flammable. There is, however, far less 
consensus in the literature about whether this top-down view can account for the SWI, for which 
several competing hypotheses exist. 
 
1.2.1 - Sensorimotor hypothesis 
A promising early explanation for the SWI came in the form of a sensorimotor mismatch hypothesis, 
stemming from the predictive way in which our fingertip forces are parameterised when lifting 
objects (Davis and Roberts 1976). When lifting the large object in a SWI-inducing pair for the first 
time, it will invariably be lifted with a higher rate of force than the smaller object. Critically, this also 
mean that the large object will be lifted with a higher rate of force than necessary and the small 
object will be lifted with a suboptimal (lower) rate of force, causing opposing mismatches between 
efference and afferance. The opposite direction of these mismatches between expectation and 
action for the small and large objects would lead to the inevitable percept that the small objects 
outweigh the large objects. These sensorimotor ‘errors’ appear to be a viable cause for the illusion 
during initial lifts of the SWI-inducing objects, where individuals do indeed overestimate the force 
requirements of lifting the large object and underestimate the force requirements of lifting the small 
object (Gordon et al. 1991). This hypothesis compatible with a range of well-establish d peripheral 
effects which can impact an individual’s perception of how heavy an object feels, such as muscle 
fatigue (Jones and Hunter 1983; Burgess and Jones 1997), tactile sensitivity (Gandevia et al. 1980), 
gripping force (Flanagan et al. 1995), and even the fingers used during lift (Flanagan and Bandomir 
2000). However, in a well-cited study Flanagan and Beltzner (2000) showed that the illusion is not 
dependant on these peripheral effects. In their study, when lifting SWI-inducing objects over 
multiple trials, individuals rapidly adapted their fingertip forces from the expectation-driven 
overestimations and underestimations to the actual (and identical) weights of the illusion-inducing 
objects over the course of a few lifts. In other words, a lifter's fingertip force errors will be rapidly 
corrected with practice, but their perceptual illusion remains strong and stable. This independence 
of the lifting errors from the perceptual illusion suggests that the SWI is unlikely to have a 
sensorimotor origin (see also Grandy and Westwood 2006; Mon-Williams and Murray 2000). 
  
1.2.2 - Bottom-up hypotheses 
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In contrast of the efference-driven sensorimotor hypothesis, Bbottom-up explanations describe 
several different (although not mutually exclusive) hypothetical mechanisms where a lifter directly 
perceives certain an ecologically-relevant variables, related to the relationship between volume and 
mass, which are they mistakenly interpreted as heaviness.  
The simplest form of this bottom-up argument suggests that lifters perceive an object’s density (a 
small object is, by definition, more dense than an equally-weighted large object), which they 
erroneously report as its weight (Ross and Di Lollo 1970; Stevens and Rubin 1970). Thus, because 
perceived weight and physical density seem to have a strong positive relationship, individuals may 
be unable to readily disentangle one from the other. This idea is analogous to common naïve physics 
misunderstandings, such as the common belief that objects of different weight will fall at different 
speeds (Kozhevnikov and Hegarty 2001). 
While this explanation is, on the face of it, plausible, it is unclear why we would accurately 
experience one physical dimensions (e.g., density) all the while inaccurately experiencing other 
clearly related physical dimensions (e.g., weight). This problem has been addressed by Gibson 
(1979), who proposed that we on perceive items in the environment in terms of their action-
relevant (known as affordances), rather than abstract physical properties. More recent bBottom-up 
explanations in this ecological vein tend to focus on properties more which are overtly relevant for 
action. Noting that large objects will typically have a different centre of mass than smaller objects, 
regardless of their weight, Amazeen and Turvey (1996) demonstrated that altering the mass 
distribution of hammer-like rods had a much larger effect on the perceived heaviness than altering 
the mass itself. This finding suggests that our ability to detect an object's rotational inertia while 
being wielded (i.e., the property of inertia tensor) may underpin the haptic SWI. This explanation, 
however, does not appear to explain the effects that visual size information can have on perceptions 
of heaviness. Furthermore, it is worth noting that even if weight illusions can be induced through 
variations in rotational inertia, it is far from clear whether this is the way this effect is naturally 
obtained. 
In a similar action-driven vein, Zhu and Bingham (2011) examined participant's judgements for the 
diameter they could throw the furthest for a sphere of a given weight and noted that these 
judgements were well-matched to judgements of the perceived weight of spheres which varied in 
mass and volume. They concluded that, rather than a being a misperception of heaviness, the SWI is 
a consequence of our perceptual expertise in selecting, based on the relationship between mass and 
volume, which object from a set could be thrown the furthest – the property of ‘throwability’. It is 
worth noting that this explanation gives no insight into the physical nature of the low-level variable 
which is perceived in the stead of an object’s mass. However,  Aa follow-up study examining 
throwing and weight illusions demonstrated that alterations to a sphere’s' centres of mass (i.e., 
manipulating their rotational inertia) does not affect throwability judgements or weight judgements 
for the different volume and mass relationships (Zhu et al. 2013), suggesting that the rotational 
effects described by Amazeen and Turvey (1996) mayare not be applicable forto the classic hand-
held SWI. 
 
1.2.3 - Top-down hypothesis 
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The top-down explanation of the SWI takes a very different conceptual approach from bottom-up, 
ecological explanations. Here, instead of directly perceiving a variable which is consciously 
understood as weight, the percept of an illusory weight difference comes about through a 
combination of prior experience with current sensory input. In the case of the SWI, an individual's 
conscious perception of how heavy the objects' feel reflects a contrast to their expectations of how 
heavy the large and small objects should be in relation to one another. It is worth noting that this 
variant of top-down, contrastive effect is not necessarily the same as the explanation outlined above 
for the MWI. In the SWI, the contrast can arise purely as a relational contrast with the other 
object(s) in the set; a short-term expectation for the object lifted 2
nd
 in relation to the larger or 
smaller object lifted beforehand. The importance of this short-term, relational expectation is 
emphasised by the fact that many SWI paradigms use stimuli that do not have a clear visual cue to 
density (i.e., the material from which they are made is not readily identifiable). The MWI, on the 
other hand, reflects a contrast to long term prior expectations (i.e., that the heavy-feeling 
polystyrene is heavier than all other polystyrene objects which the lifter has encountered), and the 
visual identity of each object is obviously emphasised. Whether this distinction is a meaningful one 
to the perceptual system remains unclear, and needs further empirical investigation. 
Recent work has provided a compelling demonstration of how statistical regularities in the objects 
we interact with can drive our subsequent perceptual experience (Flanagan et al. 2008). In several 
experiments, participants repeatedly lifted sets of objects which had an inverted size-weight 
relationship (i.e., the larger the object in a set, the lower its mass), in order to alter their prior 
expectations. The participants were then invited to judge the weight of similar-looking large and 
small objects which weighed the same amount as one another, in order to see if they experienced 
the usual SWI. Subjects who were given a relatively small amount of experience with the inverse-
density objects (lifting them just over 1000 times in a single session) experienced a slightly smaller-
than-normal SWI; the small object felt only moderately heavier than the large object. A second 
group, who lifted the inverse-density objects 1000 times a day for three consecutive days, did not 
experience the SWI at all – the identically-weighted large and small objects felt as if they weighed 
the same amount. Finally, and most convincingly, subjects who experienced the inverse density 
objects over a period of 11 days before lifting the identically-weighted objects reported that the 
large object felt substantially heavier than its identically-weighted smaller counterpart – an inverted 
version of the SWI. This study was the first to show a direct link between prior experience and 
subsequent weight perception in the context of weight illusions, providing the strongest rejection 
yet of bottom-up theories of weight illusions. 
More evidence for the representational basis of the SWI comes from another a recent study, which 
demonstrated that the SWI can be evoked in a single, unchanging, object by priming a lifter's 
expectations of what they are about to lift (Buckingham and Goodale 2010a). Subjects in this task 
were shown a large, small, or medium cube before having their visual feedback removed. Then, 
unbeknownst to the subjects, the previewed cube was taken away and replaced by the medium-
sized cube, which subjects lifted on every single trial with their vision blocked. Subjects experienced 
a robust SWI - when they saw the small cube in the preview phase, the medium-sized cube that they 
lifted felt substantially heavier than it felt after they had previewed the large cube. In this caseThis 
study is also particularly difficult to reconcile with bottom-up theories of the SWI, as the perceptual 
illusion , the SWI could not have been caused by anything other than participants’ expectations of 
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what they were about to lift, as the physical properties of the object they lifted did not change from 
trial to trial.  
 
1.3 – Different types of expectations 
In the SWI, the illusion-causing expectations about how heavy the object will be in relation to one 
another are built up across a lifetime of experiencing the regular positive correlation between size 
and weight with objects in the world. We repeatedly encounter objects with a positive size-weight 
association, leading us to expect (sensibly) that large objects will outweigh small objects (because, 
on average, they will). This statistical regularity leads individuals to predict that the large object will 
outweigh the small object. As outlined above, the illusion-inducing expectation is not the one that 
drives sensorimotor prediction; perception of the SWI appears to be unrelated to grip and load force 
rates on a given trial (Flanagan and Beltzner 2000). Furthermore, this expectation isn’t even one 
which an individual could readily articulate; after picking up the lighter-than-expected large cube in a 
standard SWI experiment only once, the lifter will readily report that they don't expect the large 
cube to be particularly heavy. But nevertheless, the SWI does not get smaller with repeated lifts of 
the illusion-inducing stimuli. This observation has led many scientists to conclude that expectations 
are unlikely to play a role in the SWI. However, an alternative explanation is that there are multiple 
types of expectation, all of which play a role in various sensorimotor processes. 
Recent evidence suggests that there may, in fact, be three separate expectations/representations 
which play a role when we lift objects. First, measured simply by asking individuals how heavy they 
expect an object to be, there are expectations which inform our conscious understanding of how 
heavy something should be. These expectations appear to be highly specific to material properties 
and the situational context of the lift. Second, by measuring fingertip forces, there are independent 
expectations which drive our sensorimotor prediction, which rapidly and precisely adjust on a trial-
to-trial basis. The final expectations which come in to play are apparent when we judge the weights 
of objects and experience the SWI. Recent evidence indicates that this illusion-causing expectation 
does not appear to be specific to particular families of objects, unlike the sensorimotor prediction or 
conscious expectations of heaviness.  Buckingham and Goodale (2013) investigated the magnitude 
of the SWI in various materials, noting that the illusion induced by large and small metal cubes was 
the same magnitude as the illusion induced by large and small polystyrene cubes. If the conscious 
expectations drove the illusion, subjects would have experienced a large SWI with the metal cubes, 
which they expected to have a far greater density than the polystyrene cubes. Thus, the 
representation which drives the SWI is not only independent from sensorimotor performance 
and/or expectation, but is also distinct from participants’ cognitive understanding of the weight 
differences and density. It is important to note that, in the majority of situations in the real world, 
these various expectations are well-aligned. It is only in experimentally-contrived situations, such as 
when lifting illusion-inducing stimuli, that these expectations can be dissociated from one another. 
 
1.4 - Strength of illusions 
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Expectation-driven contrast effects appear to explain the MWI and other classes of top-down weight 
illusions (e.g., Ellis and Lederman 1998; Dijker 2008). However, it is less clear whether expectations 
can fully account for the SWI. There are, in fact, several perspectives from which the SWI seems to 
be qualitatively different from other weight illusions. Most notably, the SWI is by far the most 
powerful weight illusion which has been documented. Although it is difficult to systematically 
compare the magnitude of the various weight illusions across laboratories, studies which have 
examined the visual size and material weight illusions using identical protocols and well-matched 
stimuli (700g cubes, lifted with a precision grip by handle on their top surface - Buckingham et al. 
2009; Buckingham and Goodale 2013; Buckingham and Goodale 2010b) show the SWI to be 
approximately three times the size of the MWI. 
There are also wide variations in the magnitude of the SWI, depending on the experimental protocol 
used to induce it. For one, the SWI is markedly reduced in the experiments which have provided the 
strongest evidence for expectations causing the misperception of weight (summarised in Section 
1.2.3). The variant of the SWI induced in a single object by priming participants' expectations  is only 
half the size of the normal SWI induced by lifting three objects with full vision (Buckingham and 
Goodale 2010a). Similarly, the magnitude of the inverted SWI (Flanagan et al. 2008) was less than 
half the size of the normal, un-inverted, SWI. Critically, the magnitude of the inverted illusion never 
became as strong as the un-inverted SWI, remaining stunted for a further 22 days of experiencing 
the inverted objects, suggesting there are limits to the plasticity of the SWI. As the studies which 
provide the strongest evidence for the role of expectations inducing the SWI show reduced-
magnitude illusions, it is clear that the illusion-inducing expectations outlined in Section 1.3 cannot 
alone account for the 'full' experience of the SWI.  
It has been known for some time that the haptic SWI is substantially larger than the visual SWI, and 
providing concurrent visual and haptic feedback does little to increase the illusion's strength over 
the haptic-only illusion (Ellis and Lederman 1993). As we are skilled at detecting variations in 
rotational inertia through haptics (Amazeen and Turvey 1996), it is possible that the fullest SWI 
comes about through a combination of top-down (i.e., expectation-driven) and bottom-up (i.e., 
ecological) effects. As outlined above, the top-down effects appear to account for about half of the 
illusion, presumably leaving various bottom-up effects to contribute to the remainder of the illusory 
differences in weight when they are permitted. The strength of these bottom-up effects likely vary 
as a function of the type of actions participants use to judge the weights of the objects in an 
experiment (i.e., precision-grip lifting, cupping and lifting the object in one's hand, or jiggling the 
object to sense it's torques). Thus, the smaller illusion experienced by participants in the single-
object SWI study (Buckingham and Goodale 2010a) can be taken to reflect the lack of differences in 
bottom-up stimulus properties seen in usual, multi-object, SWI studies. Similarly, the consistently 
smaller magnitude of the inverted SWI  (Flanagan et al. 2008) may stem from placing the top-down 
expectations and the bottom-up differences between the stimuli in opposition to one another.  It is 
not yet clear which bottom-up factors may contribute most to the sense of heaviness, although it 
has been notedlikely that this is dependent on dynamics of the lifting task and constrained by the 
shape of the object being lifted (Amazeen and Turvey 1996; Zhu et al. 2013).  
In addition to the magnitude of the illusion, future work might benefit from studying the resilience 
of the illusion under various contexts. To date, only the SWI has been examined in this light, and has 
been shown to be remarkably robust to change, with thousands of trials over multiple days required 
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to change the magnitude of the effect. Presumably this degree of resilience reflects some aspect of 
how the prior information (i.e., expectations of heaviness) associated with size cues are encoded and 
utilized by the sensorimotor system. It remains to be seen whether expectations derived from 
material or other more cognitive cues are similarly resilient to change. 
that alterations to a spheres' centres of mass (i.e., manipulating their rotational inertia) does not 
affect throwability judgements or weight judgements for the different volume and mass 
relationships (Zhu et al. 2013), suggesting that the rotational effects described by Amazeen and 
Turvey (1996) may not be applicable for the classic hand-held SWI. 
 
1.5 - Summary 
Taken together, the literature presented in this review suggests that, in isolation, none of the 
dominant hypotheses surrounding weight illusions can fully account for the SWI. However, it is likely 
that a combination of top-down (i.e., expectations of heaviness) and bottom-up (e.g., rotational 
inertia) effects can explain the illusory misperception of heaviness. Future work should aim to 
determine the nature of the bottom-up influences in weight perception as a function of the lifting 
task, and aim to determinein addition to identifying how these bottom-up effects interact with top-
down expectations across the various types of weight illusion. 
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